Iran Still Not Building Nuclear Weapons or Developing ICBMs

James Clapper, February 11, 2014

Just as he has done year after year - and most recently a couple weeks ago - U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has told two Congressional committees that Iran is not building nuclear weapons. Still, the official statement of the American intelligence community continues to be a study in conditional clauses; hypotheticals cloaked in alarmism.

Speaking before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on February 4 and then the Senate Armed Services Committee a week later, Clapper reiterated verbatim the assessment he delivered on January 29 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence:

We continue to assess that Iran’s overarching strategic goals of enhancing its security, prestige, and regional influence have led it to pursue capabilities to meet its civilian goals and give it the ability to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, if it chooses to do so... We do not know if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.

Of course, acquiring "the ability to build" these weapons is inherent and inseparable from having a domestic uranium enrichment capability and having mastered the fuel cycle, as Iran has, and has nothing to do with any actual intention of assembling a deliverable nuclear bomb.

Another copied-and-pasted assessment noted:

Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

"We judge that Iran would choose a ballistic missile as its preferred method of delivering nuclear weapons, if Iran ever builds these weapons," the statement read for the umpteenth time.

If if if if if if if if if if if.

Despite the constant flurry of hysterical, evidence-free reporting on the danger of an Iranian program to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles, the facts don't support such fears.

A recent Daily Beast article, written by Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, is illustrative. "A new U.S. intelligence report warns North Korea could resume exporting nuclear technology and material," the subheadline screams. "That could spell trouble for U.S. efforts to keep Iran from getting the bomb."

Rogin and Lake quote from the intelligence community's very same Worldwide Threat Assessment, presented to the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 29 by James Clapper:

North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor... illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities.

They add that, despite reaffirmation of its commitment "not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, North Korea might again export nuclear technology."

Damning, no? No.

Here's what last year's intelligence assessment had to say:

North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria’s construction of a nuclear reactor... illustrate the reach of its proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party Joint Statements issued in 2005 and 2007, in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.

Look familiar? What about 2012?

[North Korea's] export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria—now ended—in the construction of a nuclear reactor... illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the October 2007 Six-Party agreement—in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how—we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea might again export nuclear technology.

And 2011?

North Korea's export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries, including Iran and Syria, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor... illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the October 2007 Six-Party agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how, we remain alert to the possibility that North Korea could again export nuclear technology.

The only substantive difference between 2012 and 2011? The word "could" was replaced with the word "might."

Incidentally, what did Clapper's predecessor, Dennis Blair, have to say about this in 2010? This:

North Korea’s export of ballistic missiles and associated materials to several countries including Iran and Pakistan, and its assistance to Syria in the construction of a nuclear reactor... illustrate the reach of the North’s proliferation activities. Despite the Six-Party October 3, 2007 Second Phase Actions agreement in which North Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how we remain alert to the possibility North Korea could again export nuclear technology.

Doesn't seem like much has changed over the past four years, despite Rogin and Lake's breathless "reporting." One need not wonder why. As Gertrude Stein once wrote, albeit in a much different context, "There is no there there."

The alarmist fixation on a North Korea-Iran nuclear missile connection is nothing new. Back in 1992, the New York Times reported, "According to Israeli officials, the Iranian [nuclear] program is vigorous, and it includes purchases of Chinese and North Korean missiles capable of hitting targets in Israel, roughly 600 miles away. The Israelis say that the North Korean missiles are the latest in Scuds, and that some have been passed along to Syria..."

Fast forward over twenty years: In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 18, 2013, Clapper was asked by Joe Donnelly of Indiana, "With North Korea, what is the extent, in however much you can tell us, the extent of North Korea and Iran’s collaboration on nuclear missile technology?"

Clapper's reply? "Not much. The Iranians are a little wary of the North Koreans," he said.

Two years ago, Paul Pillar, former CIA National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, admitted, "The bottom line is that the intelligence community does not believe [the Iranians] are anywhere close to having an ICBM."

And Pillar should know. Between 2000 and 2005, he was the CIA's senior analytical officer on the National Intelligence Council and responsible for coordinating and producing precisely the assessments that Clapper is now tasked with presenting.

Last July, Greg Thielmann of the Arms Control Association reminded us, "Missile expert Michael Elleman of the International Institute for Strategic Studies has expressed doubts about whether an operational Iranian ICBM is even likely within the current decade."

To date, "Iran has never flight-tested a long-range ballistic missile—neither a 5,500 km range ICBM nor a 3,000-5,500 km range intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)," Thielmann wrote. "Moreover, in striking contrast to its active pursuit of short- and medium-range missiles, Iran has never declared or demonstrated an interest in developing longer-range systems."

An even more recent analysis by Elleman, produced in November 2013, revealed that "neither the U.S. nor Israel cite evidence that Iran is actively developing or 'building' ICBMs." He also told journalist Gareth Porter, "I've seen no evidence of Iranian ICBM development, let alone a capability."

Considering the U.S. intelligence community's assessment regarding the Iranian nuclear program hasn't changed at all in years - and no evidence showing any Iranian intention to militarize its program - it is clear that the bellicose rhetoric and baseless fear-mongering heard constantly from the mouths of Israeli officials, their lobbyists in Washington, fawning puppets in the press, and acolytes in Congress are purely political, exploiting fictitious threats with no connection to reality.

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UPDATE:

A quick reminder:

The history of Iranian ICBM hysteria is long. Back in 1993, a CIA estimate delivered to Congress claimed that Iran was "10 to 15 years" away from possessing such capability. A 1995 National Intelligence Estimate, drawn from the conclusions of all 16 American intelligence agencies, assessed Iran would have long-range missiles by 2010. Three years later, in 1998, a Republican-sponsored commission on ballistic missiles - chaired by none other than Donald Rumsfeld - concluded that Iran would have ICBMs within the next five years.

Still waitin', folks.

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